Resolved Question: Please, what do you think about my cover letter?

Dear Ms. Schmidt: I am student of Business Administration and Economics at University of Frankfurt in Germany, and I am writing to express my interest in obtaining a summer internship position with Microsoft. I would enjoy the opportunity to work with a global company such as Microsoft ,and to be a part of your management team. My qualifications are based on a combination of my education, international experience, analytical and teamwork abilities. My strongest qualification comes from having spent more than five years studying in Germany while also building global skills and gaining valuable experience through completing international internships in South Africa and Italy. I previously worked for one year as office assistant at E.C. Electrical Contractors, Johannesburg, South Africa. My recent successful work at ITB-Institute of Technology and Education, my unique mix of prior work experience as junior consultant at Balance Technology Consulting and as an assistant financial controller at Delmod International, further demonstrate my professional skills. My enclosed resume provides additional details about my background and qualifications. I speak French as my mother tongue and my German, Spain and English skills are fluent. Additionally, I have improved my Italian skills during my internship in Verona, Italy. Furthermore, I bring to the table advanced computer skills in MS Office, and programming languages including Java, JavaScript, HTML, and XML. I have made a career commitment to international management. I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss a future with your firm. If you need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time. Thank you very much for your time and consideration. Best regards from Germany, Samauel Kinsman Thank you Minta and Harry for your remarks! Are there another grammer mistakes or maybe not clearly words? Once again thank you for your helps!  more

Resolved Question: Next career move - take risk or play it safe?

I have two job offers and am trying to pick between the two. Would appreciate any advice. Quick background - started as software developer, got MBA, did strategy consulting for one of the Big-4 firms. Options on the table: a big global corporate firm, role of manager in IT division (back office function) versus a small company that has been around for less than a decade offering technology solutions to education sector, consulting / project management role. Couple of pros for the big firm - higher salary and benefits, title; cons: long commute, back office IT function. Pros for small firm - innovative work, short commute; cons: significantly lower salary, lot of uncertainty about exact role/responsibilities, higher risk. Long term goal - to do something that makes a social impact. Dilemma - which offer to take - safe + better pay or risk + lower pay? Thoughts? Thanks for the responses thus far. Social cause is important for me, but so is money. Any other tips on making a decision.  more

Resolved Question: Becoming a business Tycoon?

what should my second major be? Im already planning on majoring in International Business... I want to start an MIS/IT, Management, Operations Management, Strategic Management Consulting Firm... I want to change the Group into a sort of MOTHER COMPANY or Conglomerate Enterprise and venture into starting a Publications Company that publishes three magazines dealing with Business and Entrepreneurship, Humanitarianism and Global Health, and Luxury and High end electronics....and a Business Hotel/Resort Chain.........I probably dont have enough years in my life time to complete all of that but I at least want the plans to do so. I was thinking that MIS or IT would be great to get into. Any suggestions?  more

Resolved Question: Out of all these things to take in college, which would make the best money?

I'm a freshman in high school thinking what i want to become when i grow up. I'm choosing this by what i like and what pays well and i'm going to combine the two to see what job i can work towards. im planning to go to SUNY Binghamton and these are the studies they offer. tell me which 5-10 would pay the best and why. * Accounting * Acting & Directing * Africana Studies * American Law & Government * Anthropology * Applied Behavior Analysis * Arabic * Arabic Studies * Archaeology * Architecture & Urban History * Art History * Asian & Asian American Studies * Asian Studies * Behavioral Neurosciences * Biochemistry * Bioengineering * Biological Anthropology * Biology * Biomedical Anthropology * Biophysical Chemistry * Business Administration * Cell & Molecular Biology * Chemistry * Chinese * Cinema * Classical Civilization * Classical Greek * Classical Studies * Classics, Greek & Latin * Clinical Psychology * Cognitive Psychology * Communications, Journalism & Rhetoric * Community Service * Comparative Literature * Computer Science * Consulting & Leadership * Counseling * Creative Writing * Critical Legal Studies * Dance * Drawing * Ecology, Evolution & Behavior * Economic Analysis * Economic Policy Analysis * Economics * Ecosystems * Electrical Engineering * Engineering * English, Literature & Rhetoric * Entrepreneurship * Environmental & Resource Management * Environmental Studies * Family Studies * Finance * Financial Economics * Financial Engineering * French * Geographical Information Systems * Geography * Geology * Geological Sciences * German * German Language & Literature * Global & International Affairs * Global Management * Graphic Design * Historical Sociology * History * Human Development * Industrial & Systems Engineering * Immigration/Migration Studies * Italian * Journalism * Judaic Studies * Labor Studies * Latin * Latin American & Caribbean Area Studies * Linguistics * Literature & Creative Writing * Literature & Folklore * Literature & Rhetoric * Literature, English & Rhetoric * Management * Management Information Systems * Marketing * Materials Chemistry * Materials Science * Math * Mechanical Engineering * Medieval & Early Modern Studies * Middle East & North African Studies * Molecular Psychobiology * Music * Music Performance * Nursing * Organismic Psychobiology * Painting * Performing Arts * Philosophy * Philosophy, Interpretation & Culture * Philosophy, Politics & Law * Photography * Physical Geography * Physics * Political Science * Politics & Law * Pre-Architecture * Pre-Social Work * Printmaking * Psychobiology * Psychology * Race/Ethnic Studies * Rhetoric, Literature & English * Russian * Russian & East European Studies * Sculpture * Social Justice * Socio-cultural Anthropology * Sociology * Spanish * Studio Art * Systems Engineering * Supply Chain Management * Theatre * Theatre Acting/Directing * Theatre Design/Technical * Translation Instruction, Research & Studies * Urban & Regional Planning * Urban Planning: Economic/Retail * Urban Social Geography * Western Law & Government * Women’s Studies 09 Grad you obviously did not read what i said....i specifically said that im going to list what jobs i like and what jobs pay well and choose one that i enjoy and has good pay. im not going to choose a job i hate because it pays well and im also not going to choose a job i like that has horrible pay. im going for in between.  more

Resolved Question: Shouldnt McCain have picked this guy?

Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney has been widely recognized for his leadership and accomplishments as a public servant and in private enterprise. Elected in 2002, Governor Romney presided over a dramatic reversal of state fortunes and a period of sustained economic expansion. Without raising taxes or increasing debt, Governor Romney balanced the budget every year of his administration, closing a $3 billion budget gap inherited when he took office. By eliminating waste, streamlining the government, and enacting comprehensive economic reforms to stimulate growth in Massachusetts, Romney got the economy moving again and transformed deficits into surpluses. At the beginning of Governor Romney's term, Massachusetts was losing thousands of jobs every month. By the time he left office, the unemployment rate was lower, hundreds of companies had expanded or moved to Massachusetts, and in the last two years of his term, the state had added approximately 60,000 jobs. One of Governor Romney's top priorities was reforming the education system so that young people could compete for better paying jobs in the global economy of the future. In 2004, Governor Romney established the John and Abigail Adams Scholarship Program to reward the top 25 percent of Massachusetts high school students with a four-year, tuition-free scholarship to any Massachusetts public university or college. He has also championed a package of education reforms, including merit pay, an emphasis on math and science instruction, important new intervention programs for failing schools and English immersion for foreign-speaking students. In 2006, Governor Romney proposed and signed into law a private, market-based reform that ensures every Massachusetts citizen will have health insurance, without a government takeover and without raising taxes. Governor Romney was elected to the Chairmanship of the Republican Governors Association by his fellow Governors for the 2006 election cycle, and raised a record $27 million for candidates running in State House contests around the country. Romney first gained national recognition for his role in turning around the 2002 Winter Olympics. With the 2002 Games mired in controversy and facing a financial crisis, Romney left behind a successful career as an entrepreneur to take over as President and CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. Governor Romney has said he felt compelled to assume the seemingly impossible task of rescuing the Games by both the urgings of his wife, Ann, and by the memory of his father, George Romney, who had been a successful businessman, three-term Governor of Michigan, and a tireless advocate of volunteerism in America. In his three years at the helm in Salt Lake, Romney erased a $379 million operating deficit, organized 23,000 volunteers, galvanized community spirit and oversaw an unprecedented security mobilization just months after the September 11th attacks, leading to one of the most successful Olympics in our country's history. Prior to his Olympic service, Mitt Romney enjoyed a successful career helping businesses grow and improve their operations. From 1978 to 1984, Mr. Romney was a Vice President at Bain & Company, Inc., a leading management consulting firm. In 1984, Romney founded Bain Capital, one of the nation's most successful venture capital and investment companies. Bain Capital helped launch hundreds of companies on a successful course, including Staples, Bright Horizons Family Solutions, Domino's Pizza, Sealy, Brookstone, and The Sports Authority. He was asked to return to Bain & Company as CEO several years later in order to lead a financial restructuring of the organization. Today, Bain & Company employs more than 2,000 people in 25 offices worldwide. Governor Romney has been deeply involved in community and civic affairs, serving extensively in his church and numerous charities including City Year, the Boy Scouts, and the Points of Light Foundation. He was also the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate in 1994. Governor Romney received his B.A., with Highest Honors, from Brigham Young University in 1971. In 1975, he was awarded an MBA from Harvard Business School, where he was named a Baker Scholar, and a J.D., cum laude, from Harvard Law School.  more

Resolved Question: Can anyone tell me how long will it take to become a DBA ?

Today im working as Junior software engineer (1.5 yrs in present role)- oracle apps,,, im now working with a global management consulting, technology services and outsourcing company. How long much minimum time will it take to become a oracle dba ? what will be the minimum salary pa that i can expect at this time - after becoming dba ?  more

Resolved Question: Would you rather lose a computer programming job to outsourcing or a fruit-picking job to an illegal worker?

Everyone whines about the illegal workers, but we're losing more substantial jobs overseas... Read excerpt: Boston-based consultancy Forrester estimates that 400,000 service jobs have been lost to offshoring since 2000, with jobs leaving at a rate of 12,000 to 15,000 per month, says John McCarthy, the company's director of research. Other estimates say up to 20,000 jobs a month may be moving overseas. This is in addition to the 2 million manufacturing jobs that are estimated to have moved offshore since 1983. These numbers are predicted to rise. Management consulting firm McKinsey & Company's economic think tank, the McKinsey Global Institute, predicts that white-collar offshoring will increase at a rate of 30 percent to 40 percent over the next five years. By 2015, Forrester predicts, roughly 3.3 million service jobs will have moved offshore, including 1.7 million "back office" jobs such as payroll processing and accounting, and 473,000 jobs in the information technology industry I know we don't want to lose jobs to anyone, but to me, this is way worse than hiring illegals to pick fruit...  more

Resolved Question: Principles of marketing?

Q1 Understanding customers are not enough. As the game console market shows this is a period of intense competition in local and global markets. Explain how companies can gain a competitive advantage by analyzing and positioning Q2 Portfolio analysis helps managers evaluate the strategic business units (SBU) making up the company. Explain how the Boston consulting group matrix can help management assess the attractiveness of SBUs and how it can be used to develop growth strategies. Q3 A marketing audit presets the background data on the market, product, competition and distribution .explain what the key steps in the marketing environment audit. Q4 Marketing management’s job is to attract build relationships with customers by creating customer value and satisfaction .Their success will often depend on other actors in the company’s microenvironment that combine to make up the company’s microenvironment of a company. Q5 Once a company has chose its overall competitive marketing strategy it should be ready to begin planning the details of the marketing mix. Explain the marketing mix in detail with examples of how each marketing tool is used  more

Resolved Question: Why does bush want to stay in Iraq if the majority of the people don't?

Congress Must Cut Off Bush Family War Profits by Evelyn Pringle Global Research, April 10, 2007 Countercurrents.org - 2007-04-11 Email this article to a friend Print this article On Monday, April 9, 2007, the Boston Herald reported that the US military had announced the Easter weekend deaths of 10 more American soldiers, including six killed on Sunday. The Associated Press reports that, since the war began in March 2003, over 3,000 members of the US military have been killed in Iraq, as of April 8, 2007. The military reported the deaths of four more US soldiers on Tuesday. Its nearly impossible to estimate the number of deaths of civilians in Iraq, but the Herald reports that at least 47 people were killed or found dead in violence on Easter Sunday, including 17 execution victims dumped in the capital. News releases out of Iraq also report that a woman wearing a black veil and strapped with explosives blew herself up outside a police station in Iraq on Tuesday, killing 16 people. According to the January 14, 2007 LA Times, Steven Kosiak, director of budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, says that, starting with the anti-terrorism appropriation a week after the 9/11 attacks, he estimates the US has spent $400 billion fighting terrorism through fiscal 2006, which ended on September 30, 2006. In January 2007, Marine Corps spokeswoman, Lt Col Roseann Lynch, told Reuters that the war in Iraq is costing about $4.5 billion a month for military “operating costs,” which did not include new weapons or equipment. Since this war on terror was declared following 9/11, the pay levels for the CEOs of the top 34 defense contractors have doubled. The average compensation rose from $3.6 million during the period of 1998-2001, to $7.2 million during the period of 2002-2005, according to an August 2006, report entitled, "Executive Excess 2006," by the Washington-based, Institute for Policy Studies, and the Boston-based, United for a Fair Economy. This study found that since 9/11, the 34 defense CEOs have pocketed a combined total of $984 million, or enough, the report says, to cover the wages for more than a million Iraqis for a year. In 2005, the average total compensation for the CEOs of large US corporations was only 6% above 2001 figures, while defense CEOs pay was 108% higher. But the last name of one family, which is literally amassing a fortune over the backs of our dead heroes, matches that of the man holding the purse strings in the White House. On December 11, 2003, the Financial Times reported that three people had told the Times that they had seen letters written by Neil Bush that recommended business ventures in the Middle East, promoted by New Bridges Strategies, a firm set up by President Bush’s former campaign manager, who quit his Bush appointed government job as the head of FEMA, three weeks before the war in Iraq began. Neil Bush was paid an annual fee to "help companies secure contracts in Iraq," the Times said. But Neil Bush is by no means the only Bush profiting from the war on terror. The first President Bush is so entangled with entities that have profited greatly that it's difficult to even know where to begin. Bush joined the Carlyle Group in 1993, and became a member of the firm's Asian Advisory Board. The Carlyle Group was best known for buying defense companies and doubling or tripling their value and was already heavily supported by defense contracts. But in 2002, the firm received $677 million in government contracts, and by 2003, its contracts were worth $2.1 billion. Prior to 9/11, some Carlyle companies were not doing so well. For instance, the future of Vought Aircraft looked dismal when the company laid off 20% of its employees. But business was booming shortly after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began, and the company received over $1 billion in defense contracts. The Bush family's connections to the Osama bin Laden's family seem almost surreal. On September 28, 2001, two weeks after 9/11, the Wall Street Journal reported that, "George H.W. Bush, the father of President Bush, works for the bin Laden family business in Saudi Arabia through the Carlyle Group, an international consulting firm." As a representative of Carlyle, one of the investors that Bush brought to Carlyle was the Bin Laden Group, a construction company owned by Osama's family. The bin Ladens have been called the Rockefellers of the Middle East, and the father, Mohammed, has reportedly amassed a $5 billion empire. According the Journal, Bush convinced Shafiq bin Laden to invest $2 million with Carlyle. The Journal found that Bush had met with the bin Ladens at least twice between 1998 and 2000. On September 27, 2001, the Journal reported that it had confirmed that a meeting took place between Bush Senior and the bin Laden family through Senior's Chief of Staff, Jean Becker, but only after the reporter showed her a thank you note that was written and sent by Bush to the bin Ladens after the meeting. The current President’s little publicized affiliation with the bin Laden family goes back to his days with Arbusto oil when Salem bin Laden funneled money through James Bath to bail out that particular failed company. Probably the most eerie report about this strange group of bedfellows is that on 9/11, the day that served as a kick-off for the highly profitable war on terror, Shafiq bin Laden attended a meeting in the office of the Carlyle Group, and stood watching TV with other members of the firm as the WTC collapsed. The fact that so many Saudis, including many bin Ladens, were allowed to fly out of the country right after 9/11, while Americans were still grounded, has always seemed a bit strange to most people also, especially when nobody in the Bush administration was able to explain who gave permission for the flights. About a month after 9/11, in October 2001, the Carlyle Group severed its ties with the Bin Laden Group, but the Bush family did not. In January 2002, Neil Bush took a trip to Saudi Arabia that was sponsored by the Bin Laden Construction Company and Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, the same Prince who offered New York Mayor, Rudy Giuliani $10 million to help the 9/11 victims, a gesture that Rudy refused. In the fall of 2003, Bush Senior finally resigned from the Carlyle Group as the accusations of family war profiteering grew louder. However, according to the Washington Post, he still retained stock in the firm and gave speeches on its behalf for a fee of $500,000. Carlyle companies have also scored big in the Homeland Security bonanza. Federal Data Systems and US Investigations Services hold multi-billion- dollar contracts to provide background checks for airlines, the Pentagon, the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security. US Investigations used to be a federal agency, until it was privatized in 1996 and taken over by Carlyle. Marvin and Jeb Bush are also highly successful members of the family war profiteering team. Marvin is a co-founder and partner in Winston Partners, a private investment firm, and Jeb is an investor in the Winston Capital Fund, which is managed by Marvin. Winston Partners is part of the Chatterjee Group, which owned 5.5 million shares in a company called Sybase in 2001, a firm that had contracts worth $2.9 million with the Navy, $1.8 million with the Army and $5.3 million with the Department of Defense. All totaled, the federal procurement database listed the firm's contracts that year as $14,754,000. And, Sybase was not the only company delivering war profits to Marvin and Jeb. The portfolio of Winston Partners also included the Amsec Corp, which, in 2001, was awarded $37,722,000 in Navy contracts. Marvin's business partner, Scott Andrews, sat on the board of directors at AMSEC, and the company's CEO was Michael Braham, who formerly worked for Paul Bremer, the leader of the Coalition Provisional Authority responsible for handing out contracts Iraq. This is the same Paul Bremer who used Iraqi money from the Development Fund for Iraq to award 5 no-bid contracts to Dick Cheney’s cash cow, Halliburton, worth $222 million, $325 million, $180 million, and $194 million combined for the last two, according to a July 28, 2004, report by the CPA Inspector General Stuart Bowen, entitled, "Comptroller Cash Management Controls over the Development Fund for Iraq." As it turns out, Halliburton received 60% of all contracts paid for with Iraqi money. In a January 2005 report, Inspector Bowen concluded that occupation authorities accounted poorly for $8.8 billion in Iraqi funds, and said, "The CPA did not implement adequate financial controls.” The President's uncle, William (Bucky) Bush, is the most visible war profiteer on the team. He sat on the board of a major military contractor called Engineered Support Systems. Six months before the war in Iraq began, on September 16, 2002, CNN/Money Magazine called ESS one of "seven defense stocks that fund managers like," and one fund manager said ESS was one of two companies that "would gain the most from a war from Iraq." As a director, Uncle William received a monthly fee and held stock options. In January 2003, before the Iraq war began, he owned 33,750 shares of stock, but a year later, in January 2004, he owned 56,251. The fact that Uncle William had an inside line to the White House can hardly be disputed. On March 25, 2003, Bush asked Congress for funding, "to cover military operations, relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and ongoing operations in the global war on terrorism," and the very next day, ESS announced a large order from the Army for its Chemical Biological Protected Shelter systems. Uncle William has become a very rich man since his nephew took office. In January 2005, SEC filings show that he made about $450,000 by selling ESS stock. But he did even better the next year. According to the Excess Report, through a series of defense contracts, ESS earnings reached record levels and set the stage for the sale of the firm to another defense contractor, DRS Technologies, in January 2006, and among the beneficiaries of the deal was Uncle William, who cleared $2.7 million in cash and stock off the sale. Its time for Congress to stop the direct deposits of tax dollars into the Bush bank accounts. Lawmakers need to notify the White House that all funding for Iraq is done, other than what is needed for the immediate removal of our troops from this disgusting war profiteering scheme.  more

Resolved Question: Is bush getting ready to declare MARTIAL LAW?

from http://www.rense.com/general69/control.htm : President George W. Bush has signed executive orders giving him sole authority to impose martial law, suspend habeas corpus and ignore the Posse Comitatus Act that prohibits deployment of U.S. troops on American streets. This would give him absolute dictatorial power over the government with no checks and balances. Bush discussed imposing martial law on American streets in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by activating "national security initiatives" put in place by Ronald Reagan during the 1980s. These "national security initiatives," hatched in 1982 by controversial Marine Colonel Oliver North, later one of the key players in the Iran-Contra Scandal, charged the Federal Emergency Management Agency with administering executive orders that allowed suspension of the Constitution, implementation of martial law, establishment of internment camps, and the turning the government over to the President. John Brinkerhoff, deputy director of FEMA, developed the martial law implementation plan, following a template originally developed by former FEMA director Louis Guiffrida to battle a "national uprising of black militants." Gifuffrida's implementation of martial law called for jailing at least 21 million African Americans in "relocation camps." Brinkerhoff later admitted in an interview with the Miami Herald that President Reagan signed off on the initiatives and they remained in place, dormant, until George W. Bush took office. Brinkerhoff moved on the Anser Institute for Homeland Security and, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, provided the Bush White House and the Pentagon with talking points supporting revised "national security initiatives" that would could allow imposition of martial law and suspension of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1978, the law that is supposed to forbid use of troops for domestic law enforcement. Brinkerhoff wrote that intentions of Posse Comitatus are "misunderstood and misapplied" and that the U.S. has in times of national emergency the "full and absolute authority" to send troops into American streets to "enforce order and maintain the peace." Bush used parts of the plan to send troops into the streets of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. In addition, FEMA hired former special forces personnel from the mercenary firm Blackwater USA to "enforce security." Blackwater USA, in its promotional materials, describes itself as "the most comprehensive professional military, law enforcement, security, peacekeeping, and stability operations company in the world," adding that "we have established a global presence and provide training and operational solutions for the 21st century in support of security and peace, and freedom and democracy everywhere." Blackwater is also a major U.S. contractor in Iraq and has a contract with the Bush White House to provide additional security work "on an as-needed basis." The Department of Homeland Security established the "Northern Command for National Defense," a wide-ranging program that includes FEMA, the Pentagon, the FBI and the National Security Agency. Executive orders already signed by Bush allow the Northern Command to send troops into American streets, seize control of radio and television stations and networks and impose martial law "in times of national emergency." The authority to declare what is or is not a national emergency rests entirely with Bush who does not have to either consult or seek the approval of Congress for permission to assume absolute control over the government of the United States. The White House press office would neither confirm nor deny existence of Bush's executive orders or the existence of the Northern Command for National Defense. Neither would the Department of Homeland Security. But my sources within the White House and DHS tell me the plans are in place, ready for implementation when the command comes from the man who keeps telling the American public that he is a "war time president" who will "do anything in my power" to impose his will on the people of the United States. And he has made sure that power will be absolute when he chooses to use it. Yeah, Serpico, I copied and pasted. So What? It is a news article that i put here because i know some people are too lazy to click a link. Well, i guess 9/11 justifies everything to you people. why don't we just kill all muslims all around the world? that would keep another 9/11 from happening right? thats not enough? well lets kill all chinese too! and north koreans...and Venezualens...then liberals...then red haired people...then dorks....then handicapped people.... You don't think he would maybe first have a false flag terror attack and then declare martial law? then the soldiers would be duped into doing whatever the government tells them needs to be done.  more

Resolved Question: what are the legal issues?

NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT CITATION: Ehsman v Nutectime International [2006] NSWSC 887 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity FILE NUMBER(S): 5189/05 HEARING DATE{S): 31 March 2006 DECISION DATE: 01/09/2006 PARTIES: Patricia Mary Ehsman (P/A) Nutectime International Pty Ltd (D1/R1) David Neilan Brady (D2/R2) Francis Joseph Frasca (D3/R3) David Bruce Paix (D4/R4) Timentel Pty Ltd (D5) JUDGMENT OF: Austin J LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Not Applicable COUNSEL: R Harper SC (P/A) M J Cohen (D1-4/R1-4) SOLICITORS: McDonald Johnson (P/A) Sparke Helmore (D1-4, R1-4) CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS - statutory derivative action - application by 35% shareholder/director to bring derivative proceedings after company's assets were transferred to a company from which the applicant is excluded - inadequacies of proposed points of claim - whether those inadequacies prevent the court from determining the application under s 237 - distinction between personal and derivative claims - whether court is satisfied concerning good faith, best interests of company and serious question to be tried - ancillary order for applicant to indemnify company with respect to costs of derivative proceedings - considerations relating to the bringing of derivative and personal claims in single proceedings ACTS CITED: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180-184, 232, 236-242 DECISION: See under heading "Conclusions" JUDGMENT: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES EQUITY DIVISION CORPORATIONS LIST AUSTIN J FRIDAY 1 SEPTEMBER 2006 5189/05PATRICIA MARY EHSMAN V NUTECTIME INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD & 4 ORS JUDGMENT 1HIS HONOUR: Before me is an application by the plaintiff, Mrs Ehsman, for leave under s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to bring proceedings on behalf of the fifth defendant company, Timentel, by filing and serving a further amended originating process and amended points of claim. 2 , 3, 4, 5 and 6 Deleted The plaintiff's case 7The parties agree that Mr Brady and Mr and Mrs Ehsman came together in a business venture before Timentel was formed. Mrs Ehsman owned some patents for a split face wristwatch display, and she wished to exploit them commercially. Mr Brady had some marketing experience. There are disagreements about the commercial utility of Mrs Ehsman's patents, and as to the precise terms of their arrangements, which need not be resolved for present purposes. It is common ground that they respectively brought to the business of Timentel, when it was formed in 1998, the patents (such as they were) and a measure of marketing/commercial input. 8When Timentel was formed, Mrs Ehsman granted it a licence over her patents, for no consideration (although she received shares in the licensee entity). There is disputed evidence as to whether, as Mrs Ehsman asserts, she entered into the licence agreement in reliance on the assumption, encouraged by Mr Brady, that the licence would always be held by a company in which she would be a director and shareholder. The licensee's interest in the licence agreement was assignable. Mrs Ehsman claims, and the defendants deny, that it was a term and condition of the licence agreement that the licence would not be assigned by Timentel to a company in which Mrs Ehsman was not a shareholder and director. 9Initially the only shareholders were the Ehsmans and Mr Brady, and Mr Brady and Mrs Ehsman were the directors. Mr Brady's evidence is that he devoted very considerable time and effort, and expense, to travelling to Europe to negotiate for the commercial exploitation of the split face wristwatch display. According to him, the people he consulted in Europe told him that Mrs Ehsman's patents were just concepts and it would be necessary to work out the most efficacious interior wristwatch mechanisms to support the split face. That is disputed by Mrs Ehsman. But it is clear enough that Mr Brady did do some amount of developmental/marketing work in Europe, the cost of which was shared or partly shared with the Ehsmans. 10Mr Brady's evidence is that he came up with the idea of having movements in each half of the split face watch case for the forward and return hand movements, all controlled by an electronic integrated circuit, and that Mr Claude Ray, an experienced watchmaker, carried out the necessary design work. The eventual product, which he called a "hinged electronic watch", was based on ideas that were fundamentally different, he said, from Mrs Ehsman's patents. These matters are contested. 11Mr Brady said he negotiated a development agreement with Mr Ray's company, using a company with which he was associated, Renaissance Management, for that purpose. In turn he caused Renaissance Management to enter into an agreement with another company with which he was associated, DNB Global Corporation (registered in the Philippines), which made advance payments to Mr Ray's company. At a final hearing of this case it will be necessary to explore these corporate relationships and their purpose, and to understand better the nature of Mr Brady's interests. DNB Global appears to bear his initials, but there is some evidence that he is just one of five directors and is indirectly a shareholder. DNB Global is important in this case because, according to Mr Brady, it incurred substantial expenses through payments for development work, for which Timentel reimbursed it out of monies borrowed by Timentel from Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. But Mrs Ehsman questions whether loans were ever in fact made by those three directors. 12Mr Brady said the development of the hinged electronic watch was very expensive and under the arrangements between them, Ms Ehsman was to contribute to that development. He alleges that she defaulted in that obligation. He claims that by March 2005 she owed and had not paid about $86,000. That is contested. According to Mr Brady, the development was eventually successful and the hinged electronic watch is protected by patents in various countries, procured at a cost to DNB Global, recoverable from Timentel. 13In about June 2002 Ms Ehsman and Mr Brady decided to bring in two other parties, namely Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. There is quite a bit of evidence, not all consistent, about the circumstances in which Mr Frasca and Mr Paix were invited into the company. What is clear is that Mr Frasca and Mr Paix joined the board of directors and acquired shares, they provided some capital, and in due course they sided with Mr Brady and against Mrs Ehsman. After they joined the board, the company's issued 100 ordinary shares were divided as follows: Mr Brady 35 shares, Mr and Mrs Ehsman 35 shares, Mr Frasca 15 shares, and Mr and Mrs Paix 15 shares. 14During 2002, it seems, Mrs Ehsman visited Europe and met with one of Mr Brady's contacts, Manuel Spode of Les Artisans Horlogers. There is conflicting evidence as to what happened at the meeting. Mr Frasca gives evidence in his affidavit that the meeting led to Mrs Ehsman being criticised by the other directors for intervening secretly without the board's authority, and for her suspicious approach. Mr Frasca also says that at a meeting he had with Mr and Mrs Ehsman in 2003, they told him that they were determined to bring Mr Brady down. These matters are also disputed. Nevertheless it appears that, some time after Mr Frasca and Mr Paix arrived on the board, if not earlier, the relationship between Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix, on the one hand, and the Ehsmans, on the other hand, deteriorated. By now the relationship has completely broken down. 15There is a considerable amount of correspondence in evidence, and minutes of board meetings. I shall not describe this material in detail here. The correspondence shows that at least since early 2005, Mrs Ehsman has been concerned about verifying payments allegedly due by Timentel to DNB Global, and also about the financial management of Timentel more generally. The evidence is that the only bank account of Timentel has been relatively dormant at times when, the defendants allege, Timentel made payments to DNB Global. Mrs Ehsman's solicitors have written to Timentel's solicitors about these matters. 16Mr Brady claims that by about May 2005 there was a pressing need for capital for Timentel, to pay invoices to DNB Global of about $216,000 and certain other smaller debts. It appears that at this time Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix developed a proposal to lend Timentel up to $246,000 for a term of 60 days with interest of 17% compounding monthly, secured by a registered charge. Mrs Ehsman asked the copies of the draft loan facility and charge documents but received them only after they had been executed. A board meeting attended by Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix, but not Mrs Ehsman, on 9 May 2005 approved the loan proposal and authorised execution of the documents. Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix, acting as directors of the company, purported to authorise the company to enter into the loan facility and charge agreements in which they were the counterparties, without the consent of the other director/shareholder, Ms Ehsman. 17The defendants claim that the loan facility was drawn down and the money was used directly for payment of outstanding debts of Timentel, rather than for deposit into Timentel's bank account. Mrs Ehsman, by her solicitor, sought to verify the making of the loan but she says she has not received proper documentation. The evidence includes minutes of the board meeting of DNB Global on 18 August 2005, at which the directors of that company confirmed that the company had been paid for certain invoices, but the evidence is incomplete because, for example, the identity of the paying entity is not given. 18On 11 July 2005 Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix as lenders made a formal notice of demand for payment to Timentel of an amount of about $247,000. But they gave the company a limited extension of time to repay. Mrs Ehsman's solicitors alleged in correspondence that any attempt to enforce the charge would render it void under s 267 of the Corporations Act, because the chargees were "relevant persons" for the purposes of that section. 19The security was not enforced but instead, at some stage it was proposed that the company would enter into an asset sale agreement and a deed of assignment of the licence, in favour of the other three directors or their vehicle, for a price supported by a valuation by Les Artisans Horlogers. In correspondence, Mrs Ehsman's solicitors endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain information about the valuation - indeed, they approached the valuer directly without success. They alleged that the valuation did not cover all of the assets sold. They strenuously opposed the proposed transaction, on several grounds including that the transaction would be in breach of the contractual arrangements and understandings between Mrs Ehsman and the other three directors. 20Nutectime was formed in August 2005. The directors are Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. The company has issued 100 ordinary shares. Mr Brady owns 60 shares, Mr Frasca owns 20 shares in Mr and Mrs Paix own 20 shares. Mr and Mrs Ehsman do not hold any shares. 21The asset sale agreement and the deed of assignment of licence were entered into by Timentel and Nutectime on 2 September 2005. The transaction was considered at a board meeting not attended by Mrs Ehsman. Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix went through a procedure of formally disclosing their interest in the purchaser but then they proceeded, purporting to act as directors of the company, to approve the transaction. It appears that the contract was made and completion took place on the same day. The total sale price $277,000. According to Timentel's solicitors, the sale proceeds were used to pay out and discharge the charge over the company's assets. That appears to have meant that the bulk of the sale proceeds were directed to Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. It is not clear from the evidence whether there was any actual movement of money. 22Up until May 2005 Mrs Ehsman had been a director and (with her husband) substantial shareholder of Timentel, which was the licensee for no consideration of her patents. On one view, the company owed a substantial amount of money to DNB Global, but it had procured substantial development work for its split face watch design. Any profits from the realisation of that development work would have come to Timentel, and Mr and Mrs Ehsman would have had a 35% interest in those profits. After 2 September 2005, Mrs Ehsman was still a director of Timentel and Mr and Mrs Ehsman remained 35% shareholders. But the company's substantial assets, and any prospect it may have had of earning profits from the development of the split face watch, had gone. Mrs Ehsman was still the licensor of her patents, but she was entitled to receive no consideration for the licence. The new licensee, Nutectime, was a company in which she had no interest, and that company had acquired Timentel's assets and any profit-making opportunity relating to the split face watch. The controllers and shareholders of Nutectime were her fellow directors and shareholders of Timentel. The draft APC and draft FAOP 23From this brief account it appears that if Mrs Ehsman could substantiate her allegations, this would be a case of self-dealing by her co-directors to her considerable disadvantage, and unauthorised diversion of a corporate opportunity. Experience shows that in such cases it is important for the plaintiff to identify with particularity the precise duties said to have been breached and the circumstances of the breach. That is important in the interests of clarity of presentation of the plaintiff's case, and to ensure that the defendant is not surprised by having to meet a case at trial different from what she had been led to expect. These considerations strongly suggest that in such a case, the plaintiff should proceed by statement of claim. Where the plaintiff is proceeding in her own right, invoking the oppression remedy, and also seeking to assert the company's rights in a derivative action, the need for clarity of pleading is especially strong. 24 Deleted 25I have endeavoured to identify those allegations that relate to some right of Timentel, and distinguish them from allegations relating to some right of Mrs Ehsman personally. In summary, for reasons given below, paras 7, 18-21, 22, 23-26, and 27-29 (and the claims to relief in paras 1-5, perhaps 7, and 8) of the draft APC are claims made on behalf of Timentel, and paras 8-16, 17, 30 and 31 (and claims to relief in para 6 and perhaps 7) are claims made by Mrs Ehsman personally. 26It is important to maintain the distinction between derivative and personal claims in the interests of clarity. But nothing in Part 2F.1A requires that a derivative action be in a separate proceeding in which no personal claims are made by the person who has carriage of the proceeding. For example, in Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 732 the plaintiffs were an individual and corporate plaintiffs, and leave was granted under s 237 so as to permit the individual plaintiff (who was a shareholder and officer of the corporate plaintiffs) to assert the rights of the companies in a proceeding in which he also asserted rights of his own. The combination of corporate and personal claims was not unlike the combination of claims in the present case, though the pleading was by an elaborate statement of claim. In that case, and here, the asserted derivative and personal rights arise to a large degree out of the same alleged facts. 27Here the sole plaintiff is Mrs Ehsman, and Timentel is a defendant. It is not proposed that Timentel should become a plaintiff if s 237 leave is granted, because Timentel is properly a defendant to some of Mrs Ehsman's claims. Nor is it proposed that the derivative action be constituted as a separate proceeding, because there are substantially overlapping facts concerning the derivative and personal claims, which should therefore be heard together. Section 236(2) says that proceedings brought on behalf of a company must be brought in the company's name. But there is now a substantial line of decisions holding that, despite the literal wording of s 236(2), leave under s 237 can be given where the company is a party to the proceeding as a necessary defendant in respect of other claims, without requiring the company become a plaintiff or insisting that the derivative action be brought in a separate proceeding: see especially Keyrate Pty Ltd v Hamarc Pty Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 396, per Santow J at [18]-[19]; Metyor Inc v Queensland Electronic Switching Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 398, per McPherson JA at [14]-[15]; Charlton v Baber (2003) 47 ACSR 31, per Barrett J at [5]. 28I turn now to consider the draft APC, paragraph by paragraph. 29After preliminary allegations, para 7 of the draft APC asserts that by reason of their appointment as directors of Timentel, Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix owed Timentel various duties. There is a list of the standard duties of directors. The list reflects ss 180, 181, 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act, and also a duty to act honestly in the exercise of their powers and the discharge of their duties as directors (a formulation no longer found in the statute). [deleted latter part of paragraph] 30Having made allegations about the defendants' duties as directors of Timentel, the draft APC (paras 8-16) makes allegations about the licence agreement, leading to the assertion that the purported sale by Timentel to Nutectime of its rights under the licence agreement was in breach of the licence agreement. That is a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against Timentel (and no other defendant) for breach of contract. It is not a claim for breach of any duty owed to Timentel. 31Para 17 pleads that, by reason of matters pleaded in paras 8-11, the first to fourth defendants are estopped from asserting that Timentel was entitled to sell or assign to the first defendant the rights of Timentel under the licence agreement. This was said to arise because Mrs Ehsman entered into the licence agreement in reliance on the assumption, encouraged by Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix, that the licence would always be held by a company of which she was a director and shareholder. Clearly the allegation of estoppel is made for the benefit of Mrs Ehsman personally rather than to vindicate some right or interest of Timentel. The document does not reveal how the allegation can be made against any defendant other than Mr Brady, given that the assumption is said to have been created and acted upon at the time of the licence agreement, which was made well before Mr Frasca and Mr Paix became involved. 32Paras 18-21 make allegations about breaches of duties owed by the other three directors to Timentel. They allege that Timentel did not receive any of the proceeds of sale of assets, or received only part of the proceeds, and Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix received those proceeds or part of them. It is claimed that their conduct in receiving those proceeds constituted a breach of all of the duties pleaded in paragraph 7. I find it impossible to justify that claim, with respect to some of the duties identified in para 7, even taking into account the "particulars" to para 21. Moreover, the mere assertion that Timentel did not receive proceeds of sale and the other three directors did (even when the "particulars" to para 21 are added) cannot, per se, establish a breach of any of the duties identified in para 7. These allegations fall well short of a proper pleading. 33Para 22 alleges that by reason of the matters alleged in certain other paragraphs, Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix have been unjustly enriched as a result of breach of the duties referred to in para 7. Presumably this is intended to establish a ground of recovery for Timentel. Again, the precise matters that might constitute unjust enrichment have not been adequately pleaded and, moreover, it is not easy to see why para 22 combines breach of directors' duties with unjust enrichment. 34Paras 23-26 make allegations against Nutectime, intended to support orders declaring void and setting aside the purported sale of assets or requiring Nutectime to hold the assets in trust for Timentel. These paragraphs seem to assert some entitlement to relief on the part of Timentel rather than Mrs Ehsman, although the remedies would obviously operate for her benefit as well. The precise foundation of the remedies is not clear. The drafter has not invoked the equitable principles concerning accessory liability for breach of trust with any specificity or clarity. To the extent that entitlement to the relief is said to arise out of Nutectime being "knowingly concerned in the breach" there is a suggestion of statutory accessory liability, but the statutory directors' duties do not create any accessory civil reliability for being knowingly concerned in the primary breach. There is "accessory" liability under the statute for de facto and shadow directors, but the allegations in the draft APC do not in terms invoke that liability. 35Paras 27-29 allege that the deed of charge dated 9 May 2005 is void and should be set aside because Timentel did not receive the benefit, or received only part of the benefit, of the money purported to be advanced. This seems to be the assertion of rights of Timentel rather than Mrs Ehsman personally. A deed of charge merely provides security for advances made under some other arrangement such as a loan facility agreement. It is not easy to see why the fact (if it be so) that the chargor did not receive the benefit of loan monies purported to be advanced under a loan facility agreement should, per se, lead to the consequence that the security for the loan is void. If the charge is security for money advanced under a loan facility agreement, and no money is advanced to the chargor, then nothing is secured by the charge but the charging instrument is nevertheless valid. 36Para 30 contends that the other three directors repeatedly failed or refused to furnish information to Mrs Ehsman relating to the affairs of Timentel. Particulars are given. As expressed, this is an allegation of breach of duty to Mrs Ehsman rather than Timentel. There is no allegation of any particular duty but it seems that the drafter had in mind either or both of the statutory rights of a director to gain access to certain information under ss 198F and 290, or the director's general law right of access to the information needed to discharge her fiduciary duty (eg Edman v Ross (1922) 22 SR(NSW) 351). A director seeking to assert those rights is not required to show that inspection is sought in good faith and for a proper purpose, whereas a shareholder seeking inspection under s 247A must do so. Para 30 is not clear enough. 37Para 31 asserts that, by reason of the matters asserted, the other three directors have conducted the affairs of Timentel in a manner oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against Mrs Ehsman, or contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, contrary to s 232. Mrs Ehsman has personal standing to complain under that provision. The difficulty with para 31 is that it relies globally on all of the other allegations, some of which do not seem to be pertinent (for example, the pleadings against Timentel itself based on breach of contract and against Mr Brady based on estoppel). It should be re-formulated with more precision. 38 Deleted 39The draft FAOP contains the same claims for relief as the draft APC, and therefore suffers from the defects just noted. It also contains a prayer for an order under s 237. This is inappropriate, given that the interlocutory application presently under consideration seeks a s 237 order and also leave to file the FAOP, so that the question of s 237 leave will have been addressed before the FAOP is filed. Further, in the draft FAOP the application is said to be made pursuant to ss 232, 236 and 237. Sections 236 and 237 do not need to be mentioned, for the reason just given, and s 232 appears from the draft APC to be only one of the statutory provisions under which relief is sought, the others being the various directors' duties provisions. 40My conclusion is that the draft APC and the draft FAOP are seriously defective, and therefore I shall not accede to Mrs Ehsman's application for leave to file and serve them in their present form. What is needed is a carefully considered pleading by statement of claim. However, my view is that the draft APC identifies in broad terms, though imprecisely and at times in a confused way, some derivative and personal causes of action that emerge on Mrs Ehsman's account of the evidence. The causes of action are: (A)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against Timentel for breach of contract arising out of Timentel's purported sale and assignment to Nutectime, sounding in damages (paras 8-16); (B)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against Mr Brady based the allegation that at the time of the making of the licence agreement he encouraged her to assume that the licence would always be held by a company of which she was a director and shareholder - though the appropriate remedy, if this ground is established, is debatable (para 17); (C)claims by Timentel against Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix for breach of ss 182 and 183 and their general law duty to avoid conflicts of interest, by virtue of their self-dealing in the loan and security transactions and then the sale and assignment transactions, leading an order for an account of profit or an order setting aside the transactions, or a compensation order under s 1317H (paras 18-21 and 22); (D)a claim by Timentel against Nutectime for accessory liability under equitable principles which apply to a person who assists in a breach of fiduciary duty or receives property transferred in breach of duty, leading to an order requiring Nutectime to hold acquired property on trust or to account as a constructive trustee (paras 23-26); (E)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against the other three directors asserting infringement of her right of access as a director to information of Timentel, under the general law and perhaps under ss 198F and 290, leading to an order for access or to restrain obstruction (para 30); (F)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman for relief under the "oppression" remedy in s 232, arising out of specifically pleaded facts and circumstances, leading to a range of possible remedies to address the oppressive or unfair conduct (para 30). 41I am not persuaded that there is any viable course of action underlying paras 27-29. 42I think the appropriate course is to dismiss the application for leave to file and serve the amended points of claim, and to direct Mrs Ehsman to file and serve a statement of claim to give effect to her personal and derivative claims having regard to these reasons for judgment. 43Section 237 authorises the court to grant leave to permit a person to bring proceedings on behalf of a company. Part 2F.1A does not explain the word "proceedings" or give any direct indication of the level of specificity of pleaded allegations and prayers for relief that the applicant for leave must achieve. Typically the applicant will provide the court with a draft statement of claim or (as here) points of claim, or some other document giving particulars of the derivative claims. But in my view it cannot be the case that a full statement of the derivative claims must be presented before the court can consider and determine a leave application. Were that to be required, any subsequent amendments to the pleaded case would need to be treated as a leave application under s 237 to which the criteria in s 237(2) would have to be applied. That, in my view, would be an unnecessary burden for case management. 44In my opinion the applicant for leave must identify and describe the proposed proceedings with sufficient precision that the court can properly assess the application having regard to the criteria that it is required to consider under s 237(2), and the opponents can respond to the application in terms of those criteria. That may be achieved by presenting the court with a draft pleading, but it may be achieved in other ways such as by outlining the claims in affidavit evidence. It is not hard to envisage an application that falls so far short of identifying the derivative causes of action to be asserted that the court is left unable to assess, for example, whether it is in the best interests of the company that the applicant be granted leave, and whether there is a serious question to be tried. Here, however, Mrs Ehsman has done enough in her draft points of claim (defective though they are) and in the voluminous evidence that has been adduced, to permit me to identify the causes of action broadly described in paragraphs (A)-(F) above, of which paras (C) and (D) are derivative claims. I am able to consider the application for leave under s 237 as an application for leave to bring proceedings on behalf of Timentel by a statement of claim that would assert the causes of action identified in paras (C) and (D) and seek appropriate equitable and statutory relief. The requirements for leave to bring a derivative action 45Section 236(1)(a) allows a member or officer, inter alios, to bring proceedings on behalf of the company with the court's leave. Ms Ehsman has standing both as a member and an officer of Timentel. 46Under s 237(2) the court is required to grant the application for leave if it is satisfied of five matters set out in subparagraphs (a) to (e). Subsection 237(3) and (4) establish a rebuttable presumption that the granting of leave is not in the best interests of the company in certain circumstances, but it is agreed that those circumstances have no application to the present case. There is no suggestion of the members of the company purporting to ratify or approve the conduct of the other three directors, so as to invoke s 239. 47Of the five matters that the court must address under s 237(2), the parties agree that the notice requirement in subparagraph (e) has been satisfied here. The defendants did not concede, in terms of subparagraph (a), that it is probable that the company will not itself bring the proceedings, or properly take responsibility for them, or for the steps in them. However, the evidence before me plainly establishes that this criterion is satisfied, in respect of proceedings to pursue any derivative claims of the kind identified at paras (C) and (D) above. Timentel is under the control of the other three directors, who are acting together in respect of the company's dealings with Mrs Ehsman. The other directors (and spouse, in the case of Mr Paix) are the majority shareholders. They have caused the assets of Timentel to be passed to Nutectime, a company in which they but not Ms Ehsman are the directors and shareholders. They have asserted, in answer to the present application, both on their own behalf and on behalf of Timentel, that there is no foundation for derivative claims to be brought. It is clear from their attitude, revealed in the evidence and upon the application, that they would not authorise the company to bring such proceedings. 48That leaves for consideration subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) of s 237(2). In their submissions, the parties referred me to a substantial number of decided cases. It seems to me, however, that the courts' approach to these subparagraphs has become relatively clear in the course of decisions, and it is unnecessary for me to refer to authorities extensively. Additionally, I have reached the conclusion that this is a plain case in which all three criteria have been established, and that extensive exposition is unnecessary. Good faith 49In the Swansson case, Palmer J expressed the opinion at least two questions are generally relevant to this issue: namely, whether the applicant honestly believes that a good cause of action exists and has reasonable prospects of success; and whether the applicant is seeking to act in a derivative capacity for such a collateral purpose as will amount to an abuse of process. This approach has been followed frequently in subsequent cases. I was referred, inter alia, to the discussion by Brereton J. in Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 859, at [30]. 50The evidence shows that Mrs Ehsman believes that a derivative action exists which has reasonable prospects of success. She has given sworn evidence in para [24] of her affidavit of 9 December 2006 to the effect that the company has a good cause of action with reasonable prospects of success for the claims that she outlines. I can see no proper basis in the evidence for doubting that this belief is honest. The highest the evidence goes is in the affidavit of Mr Frasca, where he deposes to a discussion with Mr and Mrs Ehsman in 2003 in which, on his version of it, they conveyed an implacable desire to destroy Mr Brady. But that evidence is contested and in any event, if accepted, it would not point to any lack of honesty in Mrs Ehsman's belief at the present time of her prospects of success in a derivative action. 51Mr Frasca's evidence might be taken to point to a collateral purpose on the part of Mrs Ehsman. But the evidence, if accepted, relates to a conversation some years ago, and the assertion of a collateral purpose is inconsistent with Mrs Ehsman's affidavit evidence. It seems to me that if Mrs Ehsman succeeds in making out her factual contentions, there is a plausible derivative action along the lines of paras (C) and (D) above. If such a derivative action is pursued successfully it will have a beneficial effect on the position of Mrs Ehsman in Timentel. Those conclusions, arising out of the evidence as a whole, makes it difficult to maintain that Mrs Ehsman's purpose in pursuing the derivative cause of action is a collateral one. As Brereton J remarked in Maher v Honeysett (at [33]), the objective facts and circumstances speak louder than an applicant's words about her honesty and purpose, and here the objective facts and circumstances, supported by much evidence, are reasonably eloquent. 52My conclusion is that Ms Ehsman has succeeded in satisfying me that she is acting in good faith for the purposes of s 237(2)(b). Best interests of the company 53In Maher v Honeysett, at [44], Brereton J observed that the phrase "best interests" directs attention to the company's separate and independent welfare, a notion that imports the familiar concept of the interests of the company as a whole. Here it is unnecessary to investigate the qualifications to that proposition arising where the company is insolvent or near to insolvency. In the present case Mrs Ehsman's pursuit of derivative claims will, if she is successful, enure to her benefit, as I have explained. 54As Brereton J pointed out (at [45]), "the existence in an applicant of a personal interest in the outcome of a proposed derivative action, or even of a personal animus against the company or other members of it, cannot be significant, let alone decisive, because they are usual concomitants of the types of disputes which lead to derivative actions, and few if any such actions would be brought but for personal interest on the part of the relevant applicant and in the absence of animus against the company or other shareholders". I respectfully agree. The fact that Mrs Ehsman has a personal interest in the outcome of Timentel's derivative claims, and even the existence of personal animus against Mr Brady (if Mr Frasca's disputed evidence is excepted), are not matters standing in the way of the conclusion that the pursuit of the derivative claims is in the best interests of Timentel. 55Relief having the effect of returning Timentel's assets or their beneficial ownership to the company cannot be obtained by Mrs Ehsman 's pursuit of personal claims (except perhaps through some creative orders on the "oppression" ground). The most direct and obvious way of recovery of the property is for Timentel to assert claims for recovery orders derivatively through Mrs Ehsman. If those claims are successful the result will be orders for the restoration of Timentel's property, an outcome which will be in the best interests of the company, although obviously not in the best interests of the majority shareholders. 56In my view it is appropriate for the derivative claims to be pursued in proceedings in which Mrs Ehsman also asserts personal claims, provided that great care is taken to distinguish the two categories of claims and the ingredients of the case to prove each category. I hope that a first step along that path will be taken by the preparation of a statement of claim. Although there is a risk of confusion in allowing a single proceeding that asserts personal and derivative claims, there is considerable advantage in doing so where, as here, there is a substantial common substratum of fact underlying the two categories of claims (see Maher v Honeysett at [53]). 57In all the circumstances I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of Timentel, for the purposes of s 237(2)(c), that Mrs Ehsman be granted leave under s 237. Serious question to be tried 58In my view this case should be treated as a case where the applicant is applying for leave to bring derivative proceedings, rather than to intervene in existing proceedings. The effect of my granting leave to her to file a new initiating pleading will be, if the job is done properly, to overhaul and substantially reconstitute the proceedings, as proceedings in which she pursues clearly articulated derivative and personal claims. Where the applicant is applying for leave to bring proceedings, s 237(2)(d) requires the court to be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried. 59As Barrett J explained in Charlton v Baber at [55], the applicant bears the onus of proving sufficient material to enable the court to make this determination. But as I explained above, referring to Palmer J's judgment in Swansson (and see Maher v Honeysett at [19]), the court does not normally enter into the merits of the proposed derivative action to any great degree. The evidence must reach the same standard as applies for an interlocutory injunction, set out in such cases as Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v State of South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 and Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. The standard has been described as "relatively low" (Maher v Honeysett at [19]). 60In this case Mrs Ehsman has filed quite extensive evidence, which she relies on for the purposes of the application, and I also have before me substantial evidence on behalf of the defendants. I infer that the evidence before me is substantially the evidentiary cases of the parties for final relief. This is certainly not a case of affidavits hurriedly cobbled together to meet the exigencies of an interlocutory occasion. Having considered the evidence my view is that, although there are many disputed questions of fact, which I am not in a position to resolve, Mrs Ehsman's allegations are sufficiently substantial to cross the "serious question to be tried" hurdle. I am therefore satisfied that s 237(2)(d) has been met. The court's powers 61The court is empowered by s 241 to make any orders, and give any directions, that it considers appropriate in relation to proceedings brought with leave, or an application for leave. That section affirms the court's power under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) to make an order requiring that the proceedings be brought by statement of claim, a step that I shall take for the reasons I have explained. It also expressly permits the court to make orders requiring mediation, a step that the court is also empowered to take by s 26 of the Civil Procedure Act. During the course of the hearing, I floated with the parties the question whether it would be appropriate to make an order for compulsory mediation. The suggestion was not opposed and I formed the view that if the parties did not voluntarily agree to mediate I should make an order. Unless the parties have, in the meantime, organised for mediation to take place, I shall include a mediation order in the orders that I make pursuant to these reasons for judgment. 62Section 242 permits the court to make any orders it considers appropriate about the costs of various persons, including the company, in relation to proceedings brought with leave under s 237 (see Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 732, at [56]). In such a case as the present, where the company is essentially a vehicle to pursue the commercial interests of four parties, one of whom is at odds with the other three, who oppose the bringing of derivative claims, and the plaintiff wishes to combine derivative claims with personal claims largely arising out of the same facts, it seems to me appropriate to require the plaintiff to indemnify the company in respect of costs it may incur, either directly or by virtue of a court order against it, with respect to the pursuit of the derivative claims. If the indemnity were not given, the other three directors would as a practical matter be required to bear the burden of 65% of the company's costs of pursuing derivative claims which they do not want it to pursue. Obviously, to the extent that the plaintiff makes a personal claim against the company, she should not be required to give such an indemnity. Further, the indemnity needs to be qualified so that it does not apply to any cost order made by the court with the intention of overriding the effect of the undertaking. The main purpose of that qualification is to enable the trial judge to make such order as to costs as he or she thinks appropriate after the final hearing, untrammelled by an undertaking that may cause an order for costs against the company to rebound against the plaintiff; but the qualification may also be useful to allow the court to override the undertaking in circumstances not presently foreseeable. 63Mrs Ehsman has succeeded in establishing that leave should be granted to her to bring derivative proceedings on behalf of Timentel, and to file and appropriate pleading to initiate those proceedings (and also to clarify her personal claims). That suggests that she should have her costs of the interlocutory application of 12 December 2005, against the defendants other than Timentel. In my view the fact that she will be required to give an undertaking as to the company's future costs is immaterial to the question of the costs of the application. Although I have found that the draft amended points of claim are seriously defective, they nevertheless convey plainly enough the nature of the derivative claims that Mrs Ehsman wishes to pursue. The defects in the pleaded case did not, in my view, provided a justification for the attitude of complete opposition to the application that the defendants presented to the court. Conclusions 64For the reasons I have given, I propose to make orders along the following lines: (1)Subject to the condition identified in order (2), grant leave to the plaintiff, under s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), to bring proceedings on behalf of the fifth defendant against the first, second, third and fourth defendants, asserting the causes of action generally identified in these reasons for judgment and seeking all or any appropriate remedies; (2)Order (1) is subject to the condition that, before any such proceedings are brought, the plaintiff must indemnify the fifth defendant for and in respect of all costs that the fifth defendant may incur (either on its own account or under an order of the court) by reason of the bringing, maintenance and conduct of the derivative proceedings, provided however that the indemnity is not required to extend to costs that the fifth defendant may incur in the proceedings as a defendant in respect of any personal claim made by the plaintiff, and shall not apply with respect to any final order for costs in the proceedings; (3)Direct the plaintiff to file and serve a statement of claim to give effect to her personal and derivative claims, having regard to these reasons for judgment, by no later than a date to be specified; (4)Order the first, second, third and fourth defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs of her interlocutory process filed on 12 December 2005, as agreed or assessed; (5)Subject to orders (1), (2) (3) and (4), the plaintiff's interlocutory process filed on 12 December 2005 is dismissed; (6)Order that the proceedings be referred for mediation by a mediator agreed to by the parties, such mediation to take place by no later than a date to be specified; (7)Liberty to apply to Austin J on 2 days notice. 65However, I shall give the parties the opportunity to draw my attention to any particular matters that might affect the question of costs, by (for example) causing me to award costs on a different measure or to limit the order for costs in some way. I shall also give them the chance to consider my proposed orders. I shall stand the matter over for the purpose of hearing any such submissions and making orders.  more

Resolved Question: the actual decision of the case and the legal issues?

NEW SOUTH WALES SUPREME COURT CITATION: Ehsman v Nutectime International [2006] NSWSC 887 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity FILE NUMBER(S): 5189/05 HEARING DATE{S): 31 March 2006 DECISION DATE: 01/09/2006 PARTIES: Patricia Mary Ehsman (P/A) Nutectime International Pty Ltd (D1/R1) David Neilan Brady (D2/R2) Francis Joseph Frasca (D3/R3) David Bruce Paix (D4/R4) Timentel Pty Ltd (D5) JUDGMENT OF: Austin J LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Not Applicable COUNSEL: R Harper SC (P/A) M J Cohen (D1-4/R1-4) SOLICITORS: McDonald Johnson (P/A) Sparke Helmore (D1-4, R1-4) CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS - statutory derivative action - application by 35% shareholder/director to bring derivative proceedings after company's assets were transferred to a company from which the applicant is excluded - inadequacies of proposed points of claim - whether those inadequacies prevent the court from determining the application under s 237 - distinction between personal and derivative claims - whether court is satisfied concerning good faith, best interests of company and serious question to be tried - ancillary order for applicant to indemnify company with respect to costs of derivative proceedings - considerations relating to the bringing of derivative and personal claims in single proceedings ACTS CITED: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180-184, 232, 236-242 DECISION: See under heading "Conclusions" JUDGMENT: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES EQUITY DIVISION CORPORATIONS LIST AUSTIN J FRIDAY 1 SEPTEMBER 2006 5189/05PATRICIA MARY EHSMAN V NUTECTIME INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD & 4 ORS JUDGMENT 1HIS HONOUR: Before me is an application by the plaintiff, Mrs Ehsman, for leave under s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to bring proceedings on behalf of the fifth defendant company, Timentel, by filing and serving a further amended originating process and amended points of claim. 2 , 3, 4, 5 and 6 Deleted The plaintiff's case 7The parties agree that Mr Brady and Mr and Mrs Ehsman came together in a business venture before Timentel was formed. Mrs Ehsman owned some patents for a split face wristwatch display, and she wished to exploit them commercially. Mr Brady had some marketing experience. There are disagreements about the commercial utility of Mrs Ehsman's patents, and as to the precise terms of their arrangements, which need not be resolved for present purposes. It is common ground that they respectively brought to the business of Timentel, when it was formed in 1998, the patents (such as they were) and a measure of marketing/commercial input. 8When Timentel was formed, Mrs Ehsman granted it a licence over her patents, for no consideration (although she received shares in the licensee entity). There is disputed evidence as to whether, as Mrs Ehsman asserts, she entered into the licence agreement in reliance on the assumption, encouraged by Mr Brady, that the licence would always be held by a company in which she would be a director and shareholder. The licensee's interest in the licence agreement was assignable. Mrs Ehsman claims, and the defendants deny, that it was a term and condition of the licence agreement that the licence would not be assigned by Timentel to a company in which Mrs Ehsman was not a shareholder and director. 9Initially the only shareholders were the Ehsmans and Mr Brady, and Mr Brady and Mrs Ehsman were the directors. Mr Brady's evidence is that he devoted very considerable time and effort, and expense, to travelling to Europe to negotiate for the commercial exploitation of the split face wristwatch display. According to him, the people he consulted in Europe told him that Mrs Ehsman's patents were just concepts and it would be necessary to work out the most efficacious interior wristwatch mechanisms to support the split face. That is disputed by Mrs Ehsman. But it is clear enough that Mr Brady did do some amount of developmental/marketing work in Europe, the cost of which was shared or partly shared with the Ehsmans. 10Mr Brady's evidence is that he came up with the idea of having movements in each half of the split face watch case for the forward and return hand movements, all controlled by an electronic integrated circuit, and that Mr Claude Ray, an experienced watchmaker, carried out the necessary design work. The eventual product, which he called a "hinged electronic watch", was based on ideas that were fundamentally different, he said, from Mrs Ehsman's patents. These matters are contested. 11Mr Brady said he negotiated a development agreement with Mr Ray's company, using a company with which he was associated, Renaissance Management, for that purpose. In turn he caused Renaissance Management to enter into an agreement with another company with which he was associated, DNB Global Corporation (registered in the Philippines), which made advance payments to Mr Ray's company. At a final hearing of this case it will be necessary to explore these corporate relationships and their purpose, and to understand better the nature of Mr Brady's interests. DNB Global appears to bear his initials, but there is some evidence that he is just one of five directors and is indirectly a shareholder. DNB Global is important in this case because, according to Mr Brady, it incurred substantial expenses through payments for development work, for which Timentel reimbursed it out of monies borrowed by Timentel from Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. But Mrs Ehsman questions whether loans were ever in fact made by those three directors. 12Mr Brady said the development of the hinged electronic watch was very expensive and under the arrangements between them, Ms Ehsman was to contribute to that development. He alleges that she defaulted in that obligation. He claims that by March 2005 she owed and had not paid about $86,000. That is contested. According to Mr Brady, the development was eventually successful and the hinged electronic watch is protected by patents in various countries, procured at a cost to DNB Global, recoverable from Timentel. 13In about June 2002 Ms Ehsman and Mr Brady decided to bring in two other parties, namely Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. There is quite a bit of evidence, not all consistent, about the circumstances in which Mr Frasca and Mr Paix were invited into the company. What is clear is that Mr Frasca and Mr Paix joined the board of directors and acquired shares, they provided some capital, and in due course they sided with Mr Brady and against Mrs Ehsman. After they joined the board, the company's issued 100 ordinary shares were divided as follows: Mr Brady 35 shares, Mr and Mrs Ehsman 35 shares, Mr Frasca 15 shares, and Mr and Mrs Paix 15 shares. 14During 2002, it seems, Mrs Ehsman visited Europe and met with one of Mr Brady's contacts, Manuel Spode of Les Artisans Horlogers. There is conflicting evidence as to what happened at the meeting. Mr Frasca gives evidence in his affidavit that the meeting led to Mrs Ehsman being criticised by the other directors for intervening secretly without the board's authority, and for her suspicious approach. Mr Frasca also says that at a meeting he had with Mr and Mrs Ehsman in 2003, they told him that they were determined to bring Mr Brady down. These matters are also disputed. Nevertheless it appears that, some time after Mr Frasca and Mr Paix arrived on the board, if not earlier, the relationship between Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix, on the one hand, and the Ehsmans, on the other hand, deteriorated. By now the relationship has completely broken down. 15There is a considerable amount of correspondence in evidence, and minutes of board meetings. I shall not describe this material in detail here. The correspondence shows that at least since early 2005, Mrs Ehsman has been concerned about verifying payments allegedly due by Timentel to DNB Global, and also about the financial management of Timentel more generally. The evidence is that the only bank account of Timentel has been relatively dormant at times when, the defendants allege, Timentel made payments to DNB Global. Mrs Ehsman's solicitors have written to Timentel's solicitors about these matters. 16Mr Brady claims that by about May 2005 there was a pressing need for capital for Timentel, to pay invoices to DNB Global of about $216,000 and certain other smaller debts. It appears that at this time Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix developed a proposal to lend Timentel up to $246,000 for a term of 60 days with interest of 17% compounding monthly, secured by a registered charge. Mrs Ehsman asked the copies of the draft loan facility and charge documents but received them only after they had been executed. A board meeting attended by Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix, but not Mrs Ehsman, on 9 May 2005 approved the loan proposal and authorised execution of the documents. Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix, acting as directors of the company, purported to authorise the company to enter into the loan facility and charge agreements in which they were the counterparties, without the consent of the other director/shareholder, Ms Ehsman. 17The defendants claim that the loan facility was drawn down and the money was used directly for payment of outstanding debts of Timentel, rather than for deposit into Timentel's bank account. Mrs Ehsman, by her solicitor, sought to verify the making of the loan but she says she has not received proper documentation. The evidence includes minutes of the board meeting of DNB Global on 18 August 2005, at which the directors of that company confirmed that the company had been paid for certain invoices, but the evidence is incomplete because, for example, the identity of the paying entity is not given. 18On 11 July 2005 Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix as lenders made a formal notice of demand for payment to Timentel of an amount of about $247,000. But they gave the company a limited extension of time to repay. Mrs Ehsman's solicitors alleged in correspondence that any attempt to enforce the charge would render it void under s 267 of the Corporations Act, because the chargees were "relevant persons" for the purposes of that section. 19The security was not enforced but instead, at some stage it was proposed that the company would enter into an asset sale agreement and a deed of assignment of the licence, in favour of the other three directors or their vehicle, for a price supported by a valuation by Les Artisans Horlogers. In correspondence, Mrs Ehsman's solicitors endeavoured unsuccessfully to obtain information about the valuation - indeed, they approached the valuer directly without success. They alleged that the valuation did not cover all of the assets sold. They strenuously opposed the proposed transaction, on several grounds including that the transaction would be in breach of the contractual arrangements and understandings between Mrs Ehsman and the other three directors. 20Nutectime was formed in August 2005. The directors are Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. The company has issued 100 ordinary shares. Mr Brady owns 60 shares, Mr Frasca owns 20 shares in Mr and Mrs Paix own 20 shares. Mr and Mrs Ehsman do not hold any shares. 21The asset sale agreement and the deed of assignment of licence were entered into by Timentel and Nutectime on 2 September 2005. The transaction was considered at a board meeting not attended by Mrs Ehsman. Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix went through a procedure of formally disclosing their interest in the purchaser but then they proceeded, purporting to act as directors of the company, to approve the transaction. It appears that the contract was made and completion took place on the same day. The total sale price $277,000. According to Timentel's solicitors, the sale proceeds were used to pay out and discharge the charge over the company's assets. That appears to have meant that the bulk of the sale proceeds were directed to Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix. It is not clear from the evidence whether there was any actual movement of money. 22Up until May 2005 Mrs Ehsman had been a director and (with her husband) substantial shareholder of Timentel, which was the licensee for no consideration of her patents. On one view, the company owed a substantial amount of money to DNB Global, but it had procured substantial development work for its split face watch design. Any profits from the realisation of that development work would have come to Timentel, and Mr and Mrs Ehsman would have had a 35% interest in those profits. After 2 September 2005, Mrs Ehsman was still a director of Timentel and Mr and Mrs Ehsman remained 35% shareholders. But the company's substantial assets, and any prospect it may have had of earning profits from the development of the split face watch, had gone. Mrs Ehsman was still the licensor of her patents, but she was entitled to receive no consideration for the licence. The new licensee, Nutectime, was a company in which she had no interest, and that company had acquired Timentel's assets and any profit-making opportunity relating to the split face watch. The controllers and shareholders of Nutectime were her fellow directors and shareholders of Timentel. The draft APC and draft FAOP 23From this brief account it appears that if Mrs Ehsman could substantiate her allegations, this would be a case of self-dealing by her co-directors to her considerable disadvantage, and unauthorised diversion of a corporate opportunity. Experience shows that in such cases it is important for the plaintiff to identify with particularity the precise duties said to have been breached and the circumstances of the breach. That is important in the interests of clarity of presentation of the plaintiff's case, and to ensure that the defendant is not surprised by having to meet a case at trial different from what she had been led to expect. These considerations strongly suggest that in such a case, the plaintiff should proceed by statement of claim. Where the plaintiff is proceeding in her own right, invoking the oppression remedy, and also seeking to assert the company's rights in a derivative action, the need for clarity of pleading is especially strong. 24 Deleted 25I have endeavoured to identify those allegations that relate to some right of Timentel, and distinguish them from allegations relating to some right of Mrs Ehsman personally. In summary, for reasons given below, paras 7, 18-21, 22, 23-26, and 27-29 (and the claims to relief in paras 1-5, perhaps 7, and 8) of the draft APC are claims made on behalf of Timentel, and paras 8-16, 17, 30 and 31 (and claims to relief in para 6 and perhaps 7) are claims made by Mrs Ehsman personally. 26It is important to maintain the distinction between derivative and personal claims in the interests of clarity. But nothing in Part 2F.1A requires that a derivative action be in a separate proceeding in which no personal claims are made by the person who has carriage of the proceeding. For example, in Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 732 the plaintiffs were an individual and corporate plaintiffs, and leave was granted under s 237 so as to permit the individual plaintiff (who was a shareholder and officer of the corporate plaintiffs) to assert the rights of the companies in a proceeding in which he also asserted rights of his own. The combination of corporate and personal claims was not unlike the combination of claims in the present case, though the pleading was by an elaborate statement of claim. In that case, and here, the asserted derivative and personal rights arise to a large degree out of the same alleged facts. 27Here the sole plaintiff is Mrs Ehsman, and Timentel is a defendant. It is not proposed that Timentel should become a plaintiff if s 237 leave is granted, because Timentel is properly a defendant to some of Mrs Ehsman's claims. Nor is it proposed that the derivative action be constituted as a separate proceeding, because there are substantially overlapping facts concerning the derivative and personal claims, which should therefore be heard together. Section 236(2) says that proceedings brought on behalf of a company must be brought in the company's name. But there is now a substantial line of decisions holding that, despite the literal wording of s 236(2), leave under s 237 can be given where the company is a party to the proceeding as a necessary defendant in respect of other claims, without requiring the company become a plaintiff or insisting that the derivative action be brought in a separate proceeding: see especially Keyrate Pty Ltd v Hamarc Pty Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 396, per Santow J at [18]-[19]; Metyor Inc v Queensland Electronic Switching Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 398, per McPherson JA at [14]-[15]; Charlton v Baber (2003) 47 ACSR 31, per Barrett J at [5]. 28I turn now to consider the draft APC, paragraph by paragraph. 29After preliminary allegations, para 7 of the draft APC asserts that by reason of their appointment as directors of Timentel, Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix owed Timentel various duties. There is a list of the standard duties of directors. The list reflects ss 180, 181, 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act, and also a duty to act honestly in the exercise of their powers and the discharge of their duties as directors (a formulation no longer found in the statute). [deleted latter part of paragraph] 30Having made allegations about the defendants' duties as directors of Timentel, the draft APC (paras 8-16) makes allegations about the licence agreement, leading to the assertion that the purported sale by Timentel to Nutectime of its rights under the licence agreement was in breach of the licence agreement. That is a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against Timentel (and no other defendant) for breach of contract. It is not a claim for breach of any duty owed to Timentel. 31Para 17 pleads that, by reason of matters pleaded in paras 8-11, the first to fourth defendants are estopped from asserting that Timentel was entitled to sell or assign to the first defendant the rights of Timentel under the licence agreement. This was said to arise because Mrs Ehsman entered into the licence agreement in reliance on the assumption, encouraged by Mr Brady, Mr Frasca and Mr Paix, that the licence would always be held by a company of which she was a director and shareholder. Clearly the allegation of estoppel is made for the benefit of Mrs Ehsman personally rather than to vindicate some right or interest of Timentel. The document does not reveal how the allegation can be made against any defendant other than Mr Brady, given that the assumption is said to have been created and acted upon at the time of the licence agreement, which was made well before Mr Frasca and Mr Paix became involved. 32Paras 18-21 make allegations about breaches of duties owed by the other three directors to Timentel. They allege that Timentel did not receive any of the proceeds of sale of assets, or received only part of the proceeds, and Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix received those proceeds or part of them. It is claimed that their conduct in receiving those proceeds constituted a breach of all of the duties pleaded in paragraph 7. I find it impossible to justify that claim, with respect to some of the duties identified in para 7, even taking into account the "particulars" to para 21. Moreover, the mere assertion that Timentel did not receive proceeds of sale and the other three directors did (even when the "particulars" to para 21 are added) cannot, per se, establish a breach of any of the duties identified in para 7. These allegations fall well short of a proper pleading. 33Para 22 alleges that by reason of the matters alleged in certain other paragraphs, Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix have been unjustly enriched as a result of breach of the duties referred to in para 7. Presumably this is intended to establish a ground of recovery for Timentel. Again, the precise matters that might constitute unjust enrichment have not been adequately pleaded and, moreover, it is not easy to see why para 22 combines breach of directors' duties with unjust enrichment. 34Paras 23-26 make allegations against Nutectime, intended to support orders declaring void and setting aside the purported sale of assets or requiring Nutectime to hold the assets in trust for Timentel. These paragraphs seem to assert some entitlement to relief on the part of Timentel rather than Mrs Ehsman, although the remedies would obviously operate for her benefit as well. The precise foundation of the remedies is not clear. The drafter has not invoked the equitable principles concerning accessory liability for breach of trust with any specificity or clarity. To the extent that entitlement to the relief is said to arise out of Nutectime being "knowingly concerned in the breach" there is a suggestion of statutory accessory liability, but the statutory directors' duties do not create any accessory civil reliability for being knowingly concerned in the primary breach. There is "accessory" liability under the statute for de facto and shadow directors, but the allegations in the draft APC do not in terms invoke that liability. 35Paras 27-29 allege that the deed of charge dated 9 May 2005 is void and should be set aside because Timentel did not receive the benefit, or received only part of the benefit, of the money purported to be advanced. This seems to be the assertion of rights of Timentel rather than Mrs Ehsman personally. A deed of charge merely provides security for advances made under some other arrangement such as a loan facility agreement. It is not easy to see why the fact (if it be so) that the chargor did not receive the benefit of loan monies purported to be advanced under a loan facility agreement should, per se, lead to the consequence that the security for the loan is void. If the charge is security for money advanced under a loan facility agreement, and no money is advanced to the chargor, then nothing is secured by the charge but the charging instrument is nevertheless valid. 36Para 30 contends that the other three directors repeatedly failed or refused to furnish information to Mrs Ehsman relating to the affairs of Timentel. Particulars are given. As expressed, this is an allegation of breach of duty to Mrs Ehsman rather than Timentel. There is no allegation of any particular duty but it seems that the drafter had in mind either or both of the statutory rights of a director to gain access to certain information under ss 198F and 290, or the director's general law right of access to the information needed to discharge her fiduciary duty (eg Edman v Ross (1922) 22 SR(NSW) 351). A director seeking to assert those rights is not required to show that inspection is sought in good faith and for a proper purpose, whereas a shareholder seeking inspection under s 247A must do so. Para 30 is not clear enough. 37Para 31 asserts that, by reason of the matters asserted, the other three directors have conducted the affairs of Timentel in a manner oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against Mrs Ehsman, or contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, contrary to s 232. Mrs Ehsman has personal standing to complain under that provision. The difficulty with para 31 is that it relies globally on all of the other allegations, some of which do not seem to be pertinent (for example, the pleadings against Timentel itself based on breach of contract and against Mr Brady based on estoppel). It should be re-formulated with more precision. 38 Deleted 39The draft FAOP contains the same claims for relief as the draft APC, and therefore suffers from the defects just noted. It also contains a prayer for an order under s 237. This is inappropriate, given that the interlocutory application presently under consideration seeks a s 237 order and also leave to file the FAOP, so that the question of s 237 leave will have been addressed before the FAOP is filed. Further, in the draft FAOP the application is said to be made pursuant to ss 232, 236 and 237. Sections 236 and 237 do not need to be mentioned, for the reason just given, and s 232 appears from the draft APC to be only one of the statutory provisions under which relief is sought, the others being the various directors' duties provisions. 40My conclusion is that the draft APC and the draft FAOP are seriously defective, and therefore I shall not accede to Mrs Ehsman's application for leave to file and serve them in their present form. What is needed is a carefully considered pleading by statement of claim. However, my view is that the draft APC identifies in broad terms, though imprecisely and at times in a confused way, some derivative and personal causes of action that emerge on Mrs Ehsman's account of the evidence. The causes of action are: (A)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against Timentel for breach of contract arising out of Timentel's purported sale and assignment to Nutectime, sounding in damages (paras 8-16); (B)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against Mr Brady based the allegation that at the time of the making of the licence agreement he encouraged her to assume that the licence would always be held by a company of which she was a director and shareholder - though the appropriate remedy, if this ground is established, is debatable (para 17); (C)claims by Timentel against Messrs Brady, Frasca and Paix for breach of ss 182 and 183 and their general law duty to avoid conflicts of interest, by virtue of their self-dealing in the loan and security transactions and then the sale and assignment transactions, leading an order for an account of profit or an order setting aside the transactions, or a compensation order under s 1317H (paras 18-21 and 22); (D)a claim by Timentel against Nutectime for accessory liability under equitable principles which apply to a person who assists in a breach of fiduciary duty or receives property transferred in breach of duty, leading to an order requiring Nutectime to hold acquired property on trust or to account as a constructive trustee (paras 23-26); (E)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman against the other three directors asserting infringement of her right of access as a director to information of Timentel, under the general law and perhaps under ss 198F and 290, leading to an order for access or to restrain obstruction (para 30); (F)a personal claim by Mrs Ehsman for relief under the "oppression" remedy in s 232, arising out of specifically pleaded facts and circumstances, leading to a range of possible remedies to address the oppressive or unfair conduct (para 30). 41I am not persuaded that there is any viable course of action underlying paras 27-29. 42I think the appropriate course is to dismiss the application for leave to file and serve the amended points of claim, and to direct Mrs Ehsman to file and serve a statement of claim to give effect to her personal and derivative claims having regard to these reasons for judgment. 43Section 237 authorises the court to grant leave to permit a person to bring proceedings on behalf of a company. Part 2F.1A does not explain the word "proceedings" or give any direct indication of the level of specificity of pleaded allegations and prayers for relief that the applicant for leave must achieve. Typically the applicant will provide the court with a draft statement of claim or (as here) points of claim, or some other document giving particulars of the derivative claims. But in my view it cannot be the case that a full statement of the derivative claims must be presented before the court can consider and determine a leave application. Were that to be required, any subsequent amendments to the pleaded case would need to be treated as a leave application under s 237 to which the criteria in s 237(2) would have to be applied. That, in my view, would be an unnecessary burden for case management. 44In my opinion the applicant for leave must identify and describe the proposed proceedings with sufficient precision that the court can properly assess the application having regard to the criteria that it is required to consider under s 237(2), and the opponents can respond to the application in terms of those criteria. That may be achieved by presenting the court with a draft pleading, but it may be achieved in other ways such as by outlining the claims in affidavit evidence. It is not hard to envisage an application that falls so far short of identifying the derivative causes of action to be asserted that the court is left unable to assess, for example, whether it is in the best interests of the company that the applicant be granted leave, and whether there is a serious question to be tried. Here, however, Mrs Ehsman has done enough in her draft points of claim (defective though they are) and in the voluminous evidence that has been adduced, to permit me to identify the causes of action broadly described in paragraphs (A)-(F) above, of which paras (C) and (D) are derivative claims. I am able to consider the application for leave under s 237 as an application for leave to bring proceedings on behalf of Timentel by a statement of claim that would assert the causes of action identified in paras (C) and (D) and seek appropriate equitable and statutory relief. The requirements for leave to bring a derivative action 45Section 236(1)(a) allows a member or officer, inter alios, to bring proceedings on behalf of the company with the court's leave. Ms Ehsman has standing both as a member and an officer of Timentel. 46Under s 237(2) the court is required to grant the application for leave if it is satisfied of five matters set out in subparagraphs (a) to (e). Subsection 237(3) and (4) establish a rebuttable presumption that the granting of leave is not in the best interests of the company in certain circumstances, but it is agreed that those circumstances have no application to the present case. There is no suggestion of the members of the company purporting to ratify or approve the conduct of the other three directors, so as to invoke s 239. 47Of the five matters that the court must address under s 237(2), the parties agree that the notice requirement in subparagraph (e) has been satisfied here. The defendants did not concede, in terms of subparagraph (a), that it is probable that the company will not itself bring the proceedings, or properly take responsibility for them, or for the steps in them. However, the evidence before me plainly establishes that this criterion is satisfied, in respect of proceedings to pursue any derivative claims of the kind identified at paras (C) and (D) above. Timentel is under the control of the other three directors, who are acting together in respect of the company's dealings with Mrs Ehsman. The other directors (and spouse, in the case of Mr Paix) are the majority shareholders. They have caused the assets of Timentel to be passed to Nutectime, a company in which they but not Ms Ehsman are the directors and shareholders. They have asserted, in answer to the present application, both on their own behalf and on behalf of Timentel, that there is no foundation for derivative claims to be brought. It is clear from their attitude, revealed in the evidence and upon the application, that they would not authorise the company to bring such proceedings. 48That leaves for consideration subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d) of s 237(2). In their submissions, the parties referred me to a substantial number of decided cases. It seems to me, however, that the courts' approach to these subparagraphs has become relatively clear in the course of decisions, and it is unnecessary for me to refer to authorities extensively. Additionally, I have reached the conclusion that this is a plain case in which all three criteria have been established, and that extensive exposition is unnecessary. Good faith 49In the Swansson case, Palmer J expressed the opinion at least two questions are generally relevant to this issue: namely, whether the applicant honestly believes that a good cause of action exists and has reasonable prospects of success; and whether the applicant is seeking to act in a derivative capacity for such a collateral purpose as will amount to an abuse of process. This approach has been followed frequently in subsequent cases. I was referred, inter alia, to the discussion by Brereton J. in Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 859, at [30]. 50The evidence shows that Mrs Ehsman believes that a derivative action exists which has reasonable prospects of success. She has given sworn evidence in para [24] of her affidavit of 9 December 2006 to the effect that the company has a good cause of action with reasonable prospects of success for the claims that she outlines. I can see no proper basis in the evidence for doubting that this belief is honest. The highest the evidence goes is in the affidavit of Mr Frasca, where he deposes to a discussion with Mr and Mrs Ehsman in 2003 in which, on his version of it, they conveyed an implacable desire to destroy Mr Brady. But that evidence is contested and in any event, if accepted, it would not point to any lack of honesty in Mrs Ehsman's belief at the present time of her prospects of success in a derivative action. 51Mr Frasca's evidence might be taken to point to a collateral purpose on the part of Mrs Ehsman. But the evidence, if accepted, relates to a conversation some years ago, and the assertion of a collateral purpose is inconsistent with Mrs Ehsman's affidavit evidence. It seems to me that if Mrs Ehsman succeeds in making out her factual contentions, there is a plausible derivative action along the lines of paras (C) and (D) above. If such a derivative action is pursued successfully it will have a beneficial effect on the position of Mrs Ehsman in Timentel. Those conclusions, arising out of the evidence as a whole, makes it difficult to maintain that Mrs Ehsman's purpose in pursuing the derivative cause of action is a collateral one. As Brereton J remarked in Maher v Honeysett (at [33]), the objective facts and circumstances speak louder than an applicant's words about her honesty and purpose, and here the objective facts and circumstances, supported by much evidence, are reasonably eloquent. 52My conclusion is that Ms Ehsman has succeeded in satisfying me that she is acting in good faith for the purposes of s 237(2)(b). Best interests of the company 53In Maher v Honeysett, at [44], Brereton J observed that the phrase "best interests" directs attention to the company's separate and independent welfare, a notion that imports the familiar concept of the interests of the company as a whole. Here it is unnecessary to investigate the qualifications to that proposition arising where the company is insolvent or near to insolvency. In the present case Mrs Ehsman's pursuit of derivative claims will, if she is successful, enure to her benefit, as I have explained. 54As Brereton J pointed out (at [45]), "the existence in an applicant of a personal interest in the outcome of a proposed derivative action, or even of a personal animus against the company or other members of it, cannot be significant, let alone decisive, because they are usual concomitants of the types of disputes which lead to derivative actions, and few if any such actions would be brought but for personal interest on the part of the relevant applicant and in the absence of animus against the company or other shareholders". I respectfully agree. The fact that Mrs Ehsman has a personal interest in the outcome of Timentel's derivative claims, and even the existence of personal animus against Mr Brady (if Mr Frasca's disputed evidence is excepted), are not matters standing in the way of the conclusion that the pursuit of the derivative claims is in the best interests of Timentel. 55Relief having the effect of returning Timentel's assets or their beneficial ownership to the company cannot be obtained by Mrs Ehsman 's pursuit of personal claims (except perhaps through some creative orders on the "oppression" ground). The most direct and obvious way of recovery of the property is for Timentel to assert claims for recovery orders derivatively through Mrs Ehsman. If those claims are successful the result will be orders for the restoration of Timentel's property, an outcome which will be in the best interests of the company, although obviously not in the best interests of the majority shareholders. 56In my view it is appropriate for the derivative claims to be pursued in proceedings in which Mrs Ehsman also asserts personal claims, provided that great care is taken to distinguish the two categories of claims and the ingredients of the case to prove each category. I hope that a first step along that path will be taken by the preparation of a statement of claim. Although there is a risk of confusion in allowing a single proceeding that asserts personal and derivative claims, there is considerable advantage in doing so where, as here, there is a substantial common substratum of fact underlying the two categories of claims (see Maher v Honeysett at [53]). 57In all the circumstances I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of Timentel, for the purposes of s 237(2)(c), that Mrs Ehsman be granted leave under s 237. Serious question to be tried 58In my view this case should be treated as a case where the applicant is applying for leave to bring derivative proceedings, rather than to intervene in existing proceedings. The effect of my granting leave to her to file a new initiating pleading will be, if the job is done properly, to overhaul and substantially reconstitute the proceedings, as proceedings in which she pursues clearly articulated derivative and personal claims. Where the applicant is applying for leave to bring proceedings, s 237(2)(d) requires the court to be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried. 59As Barrett J explained in Charlton v Baber at [55], the applicant bears the onus of proving sufficient material to enable the court to make this determination. But as I explained above, referring to Palmer J's judgment in Swansson (and see Maher v Honeysett at [19]), the court does not normally enter into the merits of the proposed derivative action to any great degree. The evidence must reach the same standard as applies for an interlocutory injunction, set out in such cases as Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v State of South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148 and Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. The standard has been described as "relatively low" (Maher v Honeysett at [19]). 60In this case Mrs Ehsman has filed quite extensive evidence, which she relies on for the purposes of the application, and I also have before me substantial evidence on behalf of the defendants. I infer that the evidence before me is substantially the evidentiary cases of the parties for final relief. This is certainly not a case of affidavits hurriedly cobbled together to meet the exigencies of an interlocutory occasion. Having considered the evidence my view is that, although there are many disputed questions of fact, which I am not in a position to resolve, Mrs Ehsman's allegations are sufficiently substantial to cross the "serious question to be tried" hurdle. I am therefore satisfied that s 237(2)(d) has been met. The court's powers 61The court is empowered by s 241 to make any orders, and give any directions, that it considers appropriate in relation to proceedings brought with leave, or an application for leave. That section affirms the court's power under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) to make an order requiring that the proceedings be brought by statement of claim, a step that I shall take for the reasons I have explained. It also expressly permits the court to make orders requiring mediation, a step that the court is also empowered to take by s 26 of the Civil Procedure Act. During the course of the hearing, I floated with the parties the question whether it would be appropriate to make an order for compulsory mediation. The suggestion was not opposed and I formed the view that if the parties did not voluntarily agree to mediate I should make an order. Unless the parties have, in the meantime, organised for mediation to take place, I shall include a mediation order in the orders that I make pursuant to these reasons for judgment. 62Section 242 permits the court to make any orders it considers appropriate about the costs of various persons, including the company, in relation to proceedings brought with leave under s 237 (see Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 732, at [56]). In such a case as the present, where the company is essentially a vehicle to pursue the commercial interests of four parties, one of whom is at odds with the other three, who oppose the bringing of derivative claims, and the plaintiff wishes to combine derivative claims with personal claims largely arising out of the same facts, it seems to me appropriate to require the plaintiff to indemnify the company in respect of costs it may incur, either directly or by virtue of a court order against it, with respect to the pursuit of the derivative claims. If the indemnity were not given, the other three directors would as a practical matter be required to bear the burden of 65% of the company's costs of pursuing derivative claims which they do not want it to pursue. Obviously, to the extent that the plaintiff makes a personal claim against the company, she should not be required to give such an indemnity. Further, the indemnity needs to be qualified so that it does not apply to any cost order made by the court with the intention of overriding the effect of the undertaking. The main purpose of that qualification is to enable the trial judge to make such order as to costs as he or she thinks appropriate after the final hearing, untrammelled by an undertaking that may cause an order for costs against the company to rebound against the plaintiff; but the qualification may also be useful to allow the court to override the undertaking in circumstances not presently foreseeable. 63Mrs Ehsman has succeeded in establishing that leave should be granted to her to bring derivative proceedings on behalf of Timentel, and to file and appropriate pleading to initiate those proceedings (and also to clarify her personal claims). That suggests that she should have her costs of the interlocutory application of 12 December 2005, against the defendants other than Timentel. In my view the fact that she will be required to give an undertaking as to the company's future costs is immaterial to the question of the costs of the application. Although I have found that the draft amended points of claim are seriously defective, they nevertheless convey plainly enough the nature of the derivative claims that Mrs Ehsman wishes to pursue. The defects in the pleaded case did not, in my view, provided a justification for the attitude of complete opposition to the application that the defendants presented to the court. Conclusions 64For the reasons I have given, I propose to make orders along the following lines: (1)Subject to the condition identified in order (2), grant leave to the plaintiff, under s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), to bring proceedings on behalf of the fifth defendant against the first, second, third and fourth defendants, asserting the causes of action generally identified in these reasons for judgment and seeking all or any appropriate remedies; (2)Order (1) is subject to the condition that, before any such proceedings are brought, the plaintiff must indemnify the fifth defendant for and in respect of all costs that the fifth defendant may incur (either on its own account or under an order of the court) by reason of the bringing, maintenance and conduct of the derivative proceedings, provided however that the indemnity is not required to extend to costs that the fifth defendant may incur in the proceedings as a defendant in respect of any personal claim made by the plaintiff, and shall not apply with respect to any final order for costs in the proceedings; (3)Direct the plaintiff to file and serve a statement of claim to give effect to her personal and derivative claims, having regard to these reasons for judgment, by no later than a date to be specified; (4)Order the first, second, third and fourth defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs of her interlocutory process filed on 12 December 2005, as agreed or assessed; (5)Subject to orders (1), (2) (3) and (4), the plaintiff's interlocutory process filed on 12 December 2005 is dismissed; (6)Order that the proceedings be referred for mediation by a mediator agreed to by the parties, such mediation to take place by no later than a date to be specified; (7)Liberty to apply to Austin J on 2 days notice. 65However, I shall give the parties the opportunity to draw my attention to any particular matters that might affect the question of costs, by (for example) causing me to award costs on a different measure or to limit the order for costs in some way. I shall also give them the chance to consider my proposed orders. I shall stand the matter over for the purpose of hearing any such submissions and making orders.  more

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Global Management Consulting

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